Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 54
Issue 4 December

Article 10

Winter 1963

Abstracts of Recent Cases

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Abstracts of Recent Cases, 54 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 488 (1963)

This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Carolyn Jaffe Andrew*
Abstractor

United
Accomplice Witnesses-Namet v.
States, 83 Sup. Ct. 1151 (1963). Petitioner was
convicted of violating federal wagering tax laws,
and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
prejudicial error occurred when the trial court
allowed the prosecutor to ask two accomplice
witnesses questions as to which he knew they would
claim their Fifth Amendment privilege. Noting
that "no constitutional issues of any kind are
presented" and that "all that this case involves...
is a claim of evidentiary trial error," the United
States Supreme Court, per Stewart, J., affirmed,
holding that since both the accomplice witnesses
had pleaded guilty to the offenses for which
petitioner was on trial, both possessed nonprivileged information (since as to those charges
they could incriminate themselves no further) that
could be used to corroborate the Government's
case, and therefore, even though the prosecution
knew they intended to invoke the privilege and
even though the witnesses retained and exercised
valid privilege claims as to related matters, the
prosecution did not call the witnesses in bad faith,
hoping to build its case out of impermissible inferences from their use of the Fifth Amendment
privilege; that since the few valid claims of privilege by the accomplice witnesses were at most
cumulative support for an inference of petitioner's
guilt already well established by the non-privileged
portion of their testimony, the privilege claims
did not add "critical weight" to the prosecution's
case in a form not subject to cross-examination,
and therefore did not unfairly prejudice petitioner;
and consequently, petitioner's conviction must be
affirmed. The Court noted that the theories of
reversal in such cases, as applied by the Circuit
Courts, were bad faith on the part of the prosecution and unfair addition of crucial inferences
against a criminal defendant not subject to crossexamination. The Court also stated that petitioner
had failed to object to or try to cure any preju* Ford Foundation Fellow in Criminal Law, Northwestern University School of Law.

dicial effects of the procedure complained of.
Justices Black and Douglas dissented.
Appellate Procedure-People v. Kelly, 189
N.E.2d 477 (N.Y. 1963). See Search and Seizure,
injra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure--Ker v. California,
83 Sup. Ct. 1623 (1963). Petitioners' convictions
for possessing marijuana in violation of California
law were affirmed by the California District Court
of Appeal, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1961), abstracted at
53 J. Cpam. L., C. & P.S. 65 (1962), and the
California Supreme Court denied a petition for
hearing. On certiorari, petitioners contended that
evidence seized pursuant to arrests without warrants and illegal for lack of probable cause was
admitted against them in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights as declared in Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. Cmux.
L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961). In an opinion written
by Mr. Justice Clark, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that constitutionally
grounded federal standards of reasonableness
must govern in determining whether an arrest,
search or seizure is constitutionally valid for
purposes of deciding whether evidence must be
excluded under Mapp in a state criminal case.
The above holding is the only true "holding" of
this case, since it is the only element of the case
in which a majority of the Court concurred.
Justice Harlan alone disagreed with the imposition
of this standard on the states, preferring to continue judging the legality of state action in this
area by the "basic to a free society" test, equivalent to the "core" doctrine of Wolf v. Colorado.
Under this older test, Justice Harlan found the
evidence admissible, and thus voted for affirmance.
The remainder of Justice Clark's opinion, joined
by Justices Black, Stewart, and White, concluded
that the contested arrests and seizures did comply
with federal standards of reasonableness, and
they therefore voted to affirm. In a separate
opinion written by Justice Brennan, in which
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Justices Warren, Douglas, and Goldberg joined,
these Justices agreed with the test enunciated in
Justice Clark's opinion, but, upon applying that
test to the facts of this case, concluded that the
contested state action did not comply with federal
standards of reasonableness, and would therefore
reverse. Thus, the eight Justices who agreed upon
the standard to be applied were evenly divided as
to that standard's effect upon disposition of the
instant case. The point of difference was whether
state police officers who had probable cause under
federal standards to arrest petitioners violated
federal concepts of reasonableness when, for the
purpose of making the arrests, they entered
petitioners' premises by means of a key without
first demanding admittance and announcing their
purpose. CAL. PEN. CODE §844 requires demand
and announcement, but California decisional law
allows noncompliance in certain circumstances,
including cases where, as here, the officers believed
at the time that compliance would lead to the
destruction of evidence. Justices Clark, Black,
Stewart, and White found the judicial exceptions
to the statutory command consistent with federal
concepts of reasonableness, while Justices Brennan,
Warren, Douglas, and Goldberg would require
demand and announcement as a federal standard
unless the occupant actually knew of the officers'
presence, on the ground that to hold otherwise
does violance to the presumption of innocence.
[Since this is the first United States Supreme
Court case to consider questions of arrest, search
and seizure with regard to the application of Mapp
to state prosecutions since that case was decided,
the opinions should be read for the purpose of
discerning the positions of the Justices and the
present climate of the Court.]
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963). Defendants
were convicted of federal wagering and income
tax offenses. On appeal, all but one defendant
contended that they were unlawfully arrested by
internal revenue officers without warrants, and
thus the ensuing seizure of their incriminating
personal effects could not be justified as incident
to lawful arrest, and the effects were therefore
improperly admitted as evidence against them.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed as to the defendant who did not contest
the validity of his arrest, reversed and dismissed
the indictment as to one of the other defendants,

one Faliero, and affirmed as to the rest, holding
that since no federal statute authorized internal
revenue officers to arrest without warrant, the
law of New York, the state where the arrests
occurred, would determine the validity of defendants' arrests; that since the federal officers
were not "peace officers" within N.Y. CODE
C=. PRoc. §177, relating to arrests by peace
officers, because §154 of that Code limits the
definition of "peace officers" so as to exclude all
federal agents, the applicable New York provision
was §183 of the Code, relating to arrests by private
persons; that since the indictment charged defendants' offenses as misdemeanors, the law of
§183 as it applied to misdemeanors must be used,
even though under another federal revenue
statute the offenses could have been charged as
felonies; that a private person as well as a peace
officer could conduct a valid search incident to a
lawful arrest; and consequently, that defendant
Faliero's arrest was unlawful and the evidence
seized pursuant thereto inadmissible, while the
arrests of the other contesting defendants were
lawful and the evidence admissible, since §183
authorized a private person to arrest for a misdemeanor committed or attempted in his presence,
and all the contesting defendants except Faliero
were committing or attempting to commit misdemeanors in the revenue officers' presence when
the arrests took place. [See Search and SeizureSirimarco v. United States, 315 F.2d 899 (10th Cir.
1963).]
Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Burke, 215 F. Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1963). See
Confessions, infra.
Arrest, Search and Seizure--People v. Haven,
31 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1963). Defendant was convicted
of possession of marijuana and was sentenced as
a second offender. On appeal, defendant contended
that evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search
was admitted against him. The Supreme Court of
California reversed, holding that the prosecution
had the burden of showing proper justification for
the search and seizure, inasmuch as defendant
made out a prima facie case of illegality when he
established lack of a warrant; that where the
testimony of the officers that they "received
information" that defendant had narcotics at his
residence did not detail the information received,
the trial court could not determine whether that
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information would justify a reasonable belief in
defendant's guilt, and the officers' testimony that,
during a period of surveillance of the house, they
observed four or five known or suspected narcotics
dealers enter and leave, did not supply grounds
for probable cause; that the prosecution thus
failed to prove that the officers had probable cause
to arrest defendant when they entered his house;
that one officer's entry through the partially open
front door of the house without making defendant
aware of his presence and the entry of four other
officers a few minutes later were unlawful; that
since the officers' presence in the house was unlawful, they could not rely on defendant's "consent" to search, inasmuch as the voluntariness of
his apparent consent, in the context of sudden
confrontation by five officers who entered without
right or permission, could not be proved; and that
since the officers' entry was illegal, all products of
that illegality, including defendant's apparent
consent and evidence seized at defendant's apartment were inadmissible and could not be relied
on to sustain the judgment. [The Court cited
Wong Sun v.UnitedStates, 371 U.S. 471, abstracted
at 54 J.CRm. L., C. & P.S. 189 (1963), as support
for the proposition that the products (fruits) of
the unlawful entry, including defendant's consent,
were inadmissible.]
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v.Coffey,
191 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1963). See Informers,
infra.
Burglary-Smart v. State, 190 N.E.2d 650
(Ind. 1963). Defendant was convicted of first
degree burglary. On appeal, defendant contended
that the building he allegedly burglarized was not
a "dwelling house or other place of human habitation" within the meaning of the first degree
burglary statute [BuiRs' INn. STAT. §10-701
(1956 Replacement)]. The Supreme Court of
Indiana reversed with instructions to sustain
defendant's motion for new trial, holding that a
"dwelling house" was a home and remained such
even if left empty temporarily; that a "place of
human habitation" was a place where humans
actually make their abode, and such a place thus
became a place other than a place of human habitation upon being vacated, even though only
temporarily; that since the building allegedly
burglarized by defendant was a summer cottage
used for weekends and a 2 or 3 week vacation, and
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was unoccupied at the time he broke in, the cabin
was then neither a "dwelling" nor a "place of
human habitation"; and consequently, defendant
was improperly convicted of first degree burglary.
Change of Venue-R au v. Louisiana, 83
Sup. Ct. 1417 (1963). See Prejudicial Publicity,
infra.
Confessions-Haynes v. Washington, 83 Sup.
Ct. 1336 (1963). Petitioner was convicted of
robbery, and the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner contended that
since a written and signed confession resulted from
psychological coercion, its use as evidence against
him constituted a denial of due process of law.
The United States Supreme Court, per Goldberg,
J., vacated and remanded, holding that where
petitioner's testimony, to the effect that police
officers held him incommunicado and promised to
let him telephone his wife only if he would cooperate, was not contradicted by the officers,
petitioner's version of the circumstances would be
accepted, inasmuch as the officers could have
denied the testimony, if honestly able to do so;
that a concession of voluntariness contained in the
contested confession could not be given conclusive
import, since if the confession itself was coerced,
the officials would have had little, if any, trouble
securing the concession; and that "given the unfair
and inherently coercive context"-the threats of
continued incommunicado detention and promises
to be allowed to call his wife-in which petitioner's
choice to make and sign the written confession
was made, "that choice cannot be said to be the
voluntary product of a free and unconstrained
will, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Court noted that since prior to the coercive
situation petitioner had already made oral confessions, the oppressive official conduct here
utilized could not be rationalized, as it sometimes
is, as being "essential to the detection or solution
of the crime or to the protection of the public."
Justices Clark, Harland, Stewart, and Whittaker
dissented in an opinion written by Justice Clark,
stating that two oral confessions made by petitioner before the alleged coercion began, identical
in all relevant details to the confession involved in
the instant decision, were admitted at the trial
without objection; and that the contested confession was not coerced in light of petitioner's matur-
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ity and experience with the enforcement of criminal law.

Confessions-Coleman v. United States, 313
F.2d 576 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. On appeal,
defendant contended that the confession used as
evidence against him was obtained during a period
of unnecessary delay in violation of FED. R. CRwn.
P. 5(a). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding
that where defendant was arrested at 6:45 p.m.,
was questioned from 7:30 to 8:00 p.m., was left
alone from 8:00 to 8:45 p.m., confessed orally at
8:50 p.m. after five minutes of questioning, was
"booked" at 10:50 p.m. after the confession had
been reduced to writing, and was brought before a
magistrate at 10:00 a.m. the next day, the confession was obtained during a period of unnecessary delay, inasmuch as a magistrate was available
24 hours a day and since the time between arrest
and confession was not consumed only by such
necessary matters as booking, transportation, and
the like; and that since the confession was so
obtained, its admission constituted reversible
error under the McNabb-Mallory rule. Judge
Bastian dissented, stating that the delay (6:45 to
8:50 p.m. the same evening) between arrest and
confession was necessary within the meaning of
Federal Rule 5(a), since that time was taken up
with transportation, questioning, and checking
the plausibility of defendant's alibi; and that even
if the interval between arrest and arraignment
constituted an unnecessary delay, defendant's
confession, which was made during a period of
necessary delay, was admissible.

repetition of a prior confession inadmissible for
being obtained during a period of detention unlawful under FED. R. Calm. P. 5(a). The Court'of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that even though
defendant's contested second confession was made
after he had been arraigned and informed of his
constitutional rights, including his rights of
assistance of counsel and to remain silent, this
repetition of the prior confession which was
inadmissible under the McNabb-Mallory rule must
also be held inadmissible as the fruit of the earlier
confession, since to admit the repetition would in
substance and effect admit the earlier, inadmissible
confession, and thus would defeat the rule of
exclusion. While five judges concurred in this
holding, four distinguished the instant case from
prior D.C. Circuit cases [Jackson v. United States,
285 F.2d 675 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 941 (1961), abstracted at 52 J. Cmm. L., C. &
P.S. 295 (1961), and Goldsmith v. United States,
277 F.2d 335 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
863 (1960)] holding that post-arraignment repetitions of confessions inadmissible because of
McNabb were admissible where the repetitions
were made after the actual advice of counsel,
noting that in the instant case defendant had
knowledge of his right to counsel but not actual
assistance of counsel before the repetition. In a
separate concurring opinion, the fifth judge (Judge
Wright) stated that Jackson and Goldsmith
should be overruled rather than distinguished, and
added that the test of admissibility-whether the
subsequent confession is the fruit of the first
rather than the product of an intervening act of
free will-should be administered by means of a
presumption, rebuttable by the prosecution, that
it was induced by the prior confession. Four
judges dissented.

Confessions-Killough v. United States, 315
F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court erred in denying
his post-trial motions for judgment of acquittal
notwithstanding the verdict or for new trial,
United States v. Killough, 193 F. Supp. 905 (D.D.
C.), abstracted at 52 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 424
(1961), inasmuch as the oral confession he made in
absence of counsel after he had been taken before
a committing magistrate should not have been
admitted against him, since this confession was a

Confessions-United States v. Burke, 215 F.
Supp. 508 (D. Mass. 1963). Three defendants,
indicted for robbing the mails and conspiracy to
rob the mails, moved to suppress, contending that
the evidence in question was obtained by means of
illegal seizures from defendants Leo and John
Burke. The District Court denied the motions,
holding that although the arrest of Leo Burke without a warrant and without probable cause was
illegal, Leo's conversation with the arresting
officers and his surrender to them of two marked
$20 bills, after having been arrested and advised

Confessions-Rideau v. Louisiana, 83 Sup. Ct.
1417 (1963). See Prejudicial Publicity, infra.
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of his constitutional rights, were voluntary and
the result of an intervening, independent act of
free will, rather than under compulsion of the
illegal arrest, and the conversation and bills were
therefore admissible; that the evidence was not
obtained in violation of FED. R. CnR. P. 5(a),
since Leo's intoxication made delay in arraignment
necessary; that there was no illegal search or
seizure at defendant John Burke's home, because
he voluntarily took the officers to his home, and
after being fully advised of his rights, voluntarily
talked with them and gave the evidence to them;
and consequently, the motions to suppress must be
denied. The District Court stated that Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, abstracted at 54
J. Cxnji. L., C. & P.S. 189 (1963), rendered statements or surrender of property following illegal
arrest inadmissible only when made under compulsion of the illegal arrest, and that, in deciding
a motion to suppress such statements or property,
the trier of fact should suppress unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the admission
or surrender was the product of an intervening
independent act of free will.
Confessions-People v. Escobedo, 190 N.E.2d
825 (IMI. 1963). Defendant was convicted of
murder. On writ of error, defendant contended
that his confession should not have been used as
evidence against him, since it was not voluntarily
made, and because even if voluntarily made, it
was obtained after defendant requested and was
denied assistance of counsel during police interrogation. The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed,
holding that under the circumstances disclosed by
the record, there was no reason for disturbing the
trial court's finding that the confession was voluntarily made; that denial of request for counsel by
a suspect during interrogation is not in and of
itself a violation of due process; and in view of the
right of the police to interrogate suspects, which
right would effectively be precluded were counsel
present at that stage, the Court would not formulate a rule of evidence preventing the use of a
confession where defendant's request for counsel
was denied during the interrogation which produced the confession. The Court noted that
presence of counsel would prevent effective police
interrogation even though the questioning be fair,
and stated that if the police abuse their right to
interrogate, confessions so obtained would be
excluded by existing standards.
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Confessions-State v. Woodruff, 130 S.E.2d
641 (N.C. 1963). Defendant was convicted of
premeditated murder. On appeal, defendant contended that confessions introduced as evidence
against him were involuntary, having been induced by promises made to defendant by the
County Sheriff. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina ordered a new trial, holding that where as
a condition to giving information regarding the
murders defendant requested that the Sheriff
consolidate several charges against him for forgery
and have his cousin transferred from the Women's
Prison to the County Jail, and the Sheriff obtained approval for both requests, and thereafter
arranged for defendant's temporary parole in
order that he might help the Sheriff solve the
killings, during which parole he housed defendant
and gave him spending money, defendant had
every right to believe that the Sheriff had substantial influence with court officials and others in
places of authority; and consequently, the Sheriff's
statement that if defendant would help him solve
the killings, the Sheriff would try to help him if it
developed that he was involved, induced defendant
to make the confessions in question, and therefore
the confessions were not free and voluntary and
should not have been admitted as evidence.
Confessions-Grove v. State, 365 S.W.2d 871
(Tenn. 1963). Defendants were convicted of armed
robbery. On appeal, defendants contended that
coerced confessions were improperly used as
evidence against them, and that the trial court
improperly refused to allow defendants to introduce contemporaneously made confessions of
many unrelated crimes, which defendants could
prove they could not have committed, for the
purpose of showing that the confessions used
against them were coerced. Noting that the
"confessions of other crimes" point was one of
first impression in the state, the Supreme Court of
Tennessee affirmed, holding that in view of the
conflicting evidence as to physical coercion of
defendants, the findings of the trial court and
jury would not be disturbed; that since proof of
the impossibility that defendants committed the
other crimes to which they confessed would prove
nothing more than that those particular confessions were false, the trial court properly refused
the proffered confessions; and consequently,
defendants' convictions must be affirmed.
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Conspiracy-United States v. Zdde-eeld, 316
F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1963). Defendants and others
were convicted of conspiracy to use the U.S.
mails for the transmission of obscene materials.
On appeal, defendants contended that the evidence
was insufficient to sustain their convictions. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that where defendant husband and wife,
who published two magazines which were not
legally obscene but which appealed to male
homosexuals, established through advertisements
in the magazines a male pen pal club (known as
the Adonis Club), defendants were proved guilty
of conspiring to transmit through the mails the
admittedly obscene letters written between some
club members, since permissible inferences from
the evidence established that defendants had
reason to know and intended that the club they
established would lead to use of the mails to
transmit obscene letters between members.
Judge Swygert dissented, stating that all the
evidentiary facts from which the Court of Appeals
permitted the inference to be drawn that defendants knew and intended that club members
would indulge in obscene correspondence merely
tended to prove the admitted fact that defendants
knew the Adonis Club was composed primarily of
homosexuals; and therefore the proof of defendants' knowledge and intent rested on the impermissible assumption that homosexuals as opposed
to heterosexuals will inevitably indulge in obscenity
if invited to correspond with one another. Judge
Swygert added that this unwarranted assumption
destroyed the First Amendment right of homosexuals to associate together in a correspondence
club.
Cruel and Unusual Punishment-Slate v.
Margo, 191 A.2d 43 (N.Y. 1963). See Narcotics,
infra.
Discovery-Brady v. Maryland, 83 Sup. Ct.
1194 (1963). See Due Process of Law, infra.
Discovery-State v. Cocheo, 190 A.2d 916 (Conn.
Cir. 1963); State v. Clement, 190 A.2d 867 (N.J.
1963). Two state courts have recently considered
questions of discovery in criminal cases. Their
decisions indicate a growing willingness on the
part of the courts to at least permit, even if not
to compel, discovery by criminal defendants.
The defendant in State v. Cocheo contended that

the trial court erred in denying his request to see,
for purposes of cross-examining a witness, a statement previously given by the witness to the
police, and that he was entitled to the statement
as a matter of right. The Appellate Division of
the Connecticut Circuit Court affirmed, holding
that discovery in criminal cases, as in civil cases,
was within the sound discretion of the trial court.
The Court noted that since a criminal defendant's
constitutional safeguards against self-incrimination
preclude the prosecution from compulsory discovery, the principle of reciprocity prevented a
defendant from having a right to discovery. The
Court stated, however, that if a defendant has
reason to believe a witness has made a prior
inconsistent statement, defendant may request
that it be produced for examination by the court,
its further use, if any, being within the court's
discretion.
In State v. Clement, defendant sought pre-trial
inspection of his testimony before the grand
jury. The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed
and remanded the lower court's denial of the
motions, holding that since none of the reasons for
grand jury secrecy applies to a case where a defendant seeks to view his own grand jury testimony, there was "no good reason to deny defendant a fair opportunity to prepare for trial."
Discovery-Jencks Act--Campbell v. United
States, 83 Sup. Ct. 1356 (1963). Petitioners were
convicted of bank robbery, and the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court vacated
and remanded to the District Court for determination of whether petitioners had improperly been
denied access to an FBI report [365 U.S. 85,
abstracted at 52 J. Cnns. L., C. & P.S. 295 (1961)],
and the District Court determined there had been
no improper denial. The Court of Appeals held
these findings inadequate, and remanded for
further hearing and findings. 296 F.2d 527 (1st
Cir. 1961), abstracted at 54 J. Crm. L., C. &
P.S. 78 (1963). On remand, the District Court
made additional findings, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed petitioners' convictions. On certiorari,
petitioners contended that they had been improperly denied access to an FBI report for use
as a "prior statement" to impeach a Government
witness, since the report was properly producible
under the Jencks Act [18 U.S.C. §3500 (1958)].
The United States Supreme Court vacated and
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remanded in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan,
holding that where the findings of fact on the last
remand to the District Court were that one
Staula, a key Government witness, was interviewed by one Toomey, a federal agent, that
Toomey recited to Staula the substance of the
interview notes and Staula told Toomey that this
account was, to the best of his knowledge, what
had happened, that Toomey then rearranged his
notes, dictated an Interview Report from the
notes and from memory, checked the transcribed
report against the notes, and then destroyed the
notes, the District Court's finding that there was
no material variance between the Interview Report
sought by petitioners and the notes was not
clearly erroneous; that since Staula orally approved Toomey's reading of the notes, the Interview Report, which did not materially vary from
the notes, constituted "a written statement made
by said witness and... adopted... by him"
within §3500(e) (1) of the Jencks Act and thus was
producible; and consequently, the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming petitioners' convictions
in the face of the District Court's not dearly
erroneous findings. Justices Clark, Harlan, and
Stewart dissented, stating that in order to be a
"written statement" under the section applied by
the Court, the statement must be written by the
witness; or, if not reduced to writing by the
witness, must at least be approved by him in
final written form.
Double Jeopardy-Downum v. United States,
83 Sup. Ct. 1033 (1963). Petitioner was convicted
of stealing from the mail and forging government
checks so stolen, and the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed. 300 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.),
abstracted at 53 J. Cpru. L., C. & P.S. 492 (1962).
On certiorari, petitioner contended that the trial
at which he was convicted constituted double
jeopardy, since he had been placed in jeopardy
for the same offenses by a former trial at which the
jury was discharged due to absence of a material
prosecution witness. Speaking through Mr.
Justice Douglas, the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that where the prosecutor,
knowing the witness had not been found, allowed
the original panel to be selected and sworn, discharge of the jury, over petitioner's objection, on
motion of the prosecution constituted jeopardy
barring the subsequent prosecution for the same
offenses two days later, even though no proceedings
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were had at the first trial other than selecting and
swearing the jury. The Court noted that the
Government objected to petitioner's motion,
denied by the trial court, to dismiss for want of
prosecution those two of the six counts against
him which were dependent on the testimony of the
missing witness and to proceed to try him on the
remaining counts. The Court adopted as a governing principle that enunciated in Cornero v. United
States, 48 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1931)-entering upon
trial without sufficient evidence to convict because of absence of a material witness is essentially
no different from discovering the insufficiency of
evidence during trial-and implied that granting
mistrial in either type of case on motion of the
prosecution amounts to harassment by successive
prosecutions to afford a more favorable opportunity to convict, which is exactly what the prohibition against double jeopardy was intended to
prevent. Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White
joined in Justice Clark's dissent, stating that
petitioner was in no way prejudiced by the
situation, since the trial two days after the first
jury was discharged did not result in continued or
prolonged anxiety, added expense, embarrassment,
or deprivation of rights.
Due Process of Law-Brady v. Maryland, 83
Sup. Ct. 1194 (1963). Petitioner and one Boblit
were convicted of felony (first degree) murder, and
were sentenced to death. After the Court of
Appeals of Maryland affirmed, petitioner moved
the trial court for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence. The Maryland Court of
Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal from denial
of this motion without prejudice to relief under
the Maryland Post Conviction Procedure Act.
The trial court then dismissed petitioner's application for post-conviction relief, and the Maryland
Court of Appeals remanded for retrial on the
issue of punishment. 174 A.2d 167 (Md. 1961),
abstracted at 53 J. C1uM. L., C. & P.S. 230 (1962).
On certiorari, petitioner contended that, in limiting
his retrial to the issue of punishment, the Maryland
Court of Appeals deprived him of federal constitutional rights. In an opinion written by Mr.
Justice Douglas, the United States Supreme
Court affirmed, holding that where petitioner and
Boblit were jointly charged with felony murder
and petitioner denied the actual killing, suppression by the prosecution of Boblit's confession
that he, not petitioner, had done the actual
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killing, constituted a denial of due process when
suppression was effected despite petitioner's
requests that Boblit's statements be given to him,
since due process is denied whenever the prosecution fails, on request, to produce evidence in its
possession favorable to the accused, regardless of
the good or bad faith of the prosecution; but since
the highest court of Maryland had determined
that nothing in Boblit's confession could reduce
petitioner's offense below first degree murder, that
court's decision to remand on the issue of punishment but not on that of guilt did not deprive
petitioner of due process or equal protection. Mr.
Justice White, concurring in result, stated that the
majority's statement that such suppression of
evidence is a denial of due process was unnecessary
to decision of this case, since the only question
pertinent to disposition was whether Maryland
denied petitioner equal protection by granting him
a new trial only on the issue of punishment; and
that the majority's unnecessary determination of
the due process question constituted formation of
"a broad rule of criminal discovery," which task
is properly for the legislative, not the judicial,
process. Justices Harlan and Black dissented,
stating that since Maryland criminal case juries
are, by state law, the triers of law as well as fact,
the majority's assumption-that the Maryland
Court of Appeals' holding (that Boblit's confession
could not reduce petitioner's offense) rested on
that court's implicit ruling that the confession
would not be admissible on the issue of petitioner's
guilt-may be incorrect, the judgment should be
vacated and the case remanded to the Maryland
Court of Appeals to determine the basis for its
holding, because petitioner was denied equal
protection of the laws when the Maryland Court
remanded only on the issue of punishment unless
the majority's assumption is correct.
Due Process of Law-Norvell v. Illinois, 83
Sup. Ct. 1366 (1963). See Equal Protection of the
Laws, infra.
Due Process of Law-Rideau v. Louisiana, 83
Sup. Ct. 1417 (1963). See Prejudicial Publicity,
infra.
Due Process of Law-Uited States ex rel. Von
Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963). Petitioner
was convicted of forgery by a New York state
court. After he exhausted his state remedies,

petitioner's application for habeas corpus was
denied by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York. On appeal from
this denial, petitioner contended that the State's
delay in bringing his case to trial constituted a
denial of due process of law. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the
due process clause does not make the "speedy
trial" provision of the Sixth Amendment directly
applicable to state action; that four factorslength of delay, reason for delay, prejudice to
defendant, and waiver by defendant-are relevant
in determining whether state denial of a speedy
trial assumes due process proportions; and that
although the delay here complained of (3 years
and 7 months from indictment to trial) was quite
extensive, and though petitioner, who raised the
claim of undue delay at every opportunity, did
not waive his right to protest the delay, petitioner's
right to due process was not violated, inasmuch
as the reason for the delay (principal prosecution
witness was in India, beyond the State's power to
compel his return) was valid, and petitioner was
not prejudiced by the delay. The Court noted
that in this context "prejudice" meant only that
the delay caused the issues to be incapable of fair
determination, and did not refer to such matters
as petitioner's mental anguish or his inability to
maintain gainful employment.
Electronic Eavesdropping-Lopez v. United
States, 83 Sup. Ct. 1381 (1963). Petitioner was
convicted of attempted bribery of an Internal
Revenue Agent, and the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, petitioner
contended that the District Court improperly
admitted as evidence testimony as to his conversation with the agent and a recording of that
conversation, since both were obtained in violation
of his Fourth Amendment rights. In an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Harlan, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that where the
agent, one Davis, falsely represented to petitioner
that he was willing to accept a bribe, Davis was
nonetheless in petitioner's office with petitioner's
consent, and while there did not violate petitioner's privacy, since what he "seized" by use of
his powers of hearing was petitioner's voluntary
conversation with him; that Davis' testimony of
the conversation was therefore properly admitted
in evidence; and consequently, since the recording
of the conversation, which was made by means of
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a pocket wire recorder concealed on Davis' person,
was not evidence of a conversation the Government
could not have heard without use of an electronic
device, but was merely corroborative and the
"most reliable evidence possible of a conversation
in which the ...agent was a participant and which
that agent was fully entitled to disclose," the
admittedly accurate recording was also admissible.
The Court rejected the further argument that,
even if petitioner's Fourth Amendment rights
had not been violated, the Court should exercise
its supervisory power over the lower federal courts
to formulate a rule of exclusion in this case, stating
that use of this power was unwarranted in the
absence of "manifestly improper conduct by
federal officials." Chief Justice Warren, concurring
in the result, would limit the use of recorded
evidence to allow it only when corroborative of a
witness who was a party to the conversation, as
in the instant case. By citing On Lee v. United
States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), he went on, the Court
reaffirmed that case sub silentio and thus would
not so limit the use of recordings. Justices Brennan,
Douglas, and Goldberg dissented in an opinion
by Justice Brennan, stating that On Lee should
be overruled, since although persons assume the
risk that those they choose as confidantes may
betray them by telling what has been revealed,
they do not assume the risk that those persons
will secretly use electronic devices to secure
independent evidence of conversations. The
dissenting Justices further stated that On Lee
and the instant case strike a blow not only at
Fourth Amendment freedoms but also at the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and expression.
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place"; and consequently, in absence of proof of
unauthorized physical encroachment, evidence in
the form of words seized by use of the device did
not violate defendant's federal constitutional
rights, and the evidence was therefore properly
admitted against her.
Equal Protection of the Laws-Brady v.
Maryland, 83 Sup. Ct. 1194 (1963). See Due
Process of Law, supra.

Equal Protection of the Laws-Norvell v.
Illinois, 83 Sup. Ct. 1366 (1963). Petitioner was
convicted of murder in an Illinois state court in
1941. He did not appeal. Thereafter, Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), was decided, requiring
states to furnish free transcripts to indigent
defendants for purposes of appeal. Pursuant to
Griffin, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted Rule
65-1, providing free transcripts to every indigent
convicted of crime, whether convicted before or
after Grigin was decided, unless furnishing a
transcript is impossible. Petitioner moved the
trial court to furnish a transcript, the motion was
denied, and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.
On certiorari, petitioner contended that Illinois
could not avoid the Fourteenth Amendment obligation declared by Griffin even though failure to
provide petitioner a transcript was without fault
of the State. Speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, the United States Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that where the indigent petitioner was
represented by counsel at the trial, and, though
petitioner did not appeal, there was no evidence
that he could not have had the lawyer's services
for purposes of appeal, Illinois did not violate
petitioner's Fourteenth Amendment rights by
Electronic Eavesdropping--Clinton v. Commonlater failing to provide him with a transcript bewealth, 130 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 1963). Defendant was
cause the court reporter had died, no one could
convicted of feloniously receiving money from the
transcribe his shorthand notes, and an effort to
earnings of a prostitute. On writ of error, dereconstruct the transcript through testimony of
fendant contended that evidence obtained in
persons who attended the trial proved futile.
violation of her rights against unlawful search and
Justice Harlan concurred in the result without
seizure, by means of a mechanical listening device
opinion. Justices Goldberg and Stewart dissented
stuck in the wall separating defendant's apartment
on the ground that, since Griffin is retroactive, the
from the adjoining apartment, was admitted at
constitutional violation alleged occurred in 1941,
her trial. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
when petitioner could not have obtained a then
affirmed, holding that since the only evidence as
available transcript because of indigence, rather
to any penetration of the party wall was that the
than in 1956, when he could not obtain it due to
device was merely "stuck in" rather than driven factors unrelated to indigence.
into the wall, it was "reasonable to assume that
the penetration was very slight such as one made
Evidence-Suppression of-Brady v. Maryland,
by a thumb tack to hold the small device in
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83 Sup. Ct. 1194 (1963). See Due Process of Law,
supra.
Felony Murder-Peoplev. Austin, 120 N.W.2d
766 (Mich. 1963). Defendants were charged with
first degree murder, and the trial court granted
their motion to quash the information. On appeal
by the State, defendants contended that the felony
murder doctrine did not render them guilty of first
degree murder for the killing of a co-felon by the
intended victim of their attempted robbery. The
Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, holding that
since the killing of the co-felon was justifiable
homicide as to the intended robbery victim who
actually shot him, it could not by any rationale be
murder as to defendants. In reaching this result,
the Court stated that the applicable statute, Mic.
CONSOL. LAws §750.316 (1948), deems "all murder" perpetrated in designated ways to be first
degree murder, and that the statute did not apply
to this case, since the killing in the first instance
was not murder but justifiable homicide. Two of the
seven judges dissented, arguing that the defendants feloniously set in motion a chain of circumstances such that killing was reasonably foreseeable, and that they therefore should be held
criminally responsible for any death resulting from
the circumstances flowing from their initial criminal act.

prisons in the exercise of its powers of control over
prison facilities, could constitutionally prevent
plaintiff from exercising his freedom to act pursuant to his religious belief, in light of the Department of Corrections' determination that Muslim
activities constituted a threat to peaceable and
orderly behavior within the prisons; and consequently, plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim
on which relief could be granted.
Hearsay Evidence-Crosby v. Commonwealth,
130 S.E.2d 467 (Va. 1963). See Scientific Evidence-Radar, infra.
Homicide-People v. Austin, 120 N.W.2d 766
(Mich. 1963). See Felony Murder, supra.
Homicide-Aven v. State, 152 So. 2d 924 (Miss.
1963). See Self-Defense, infra.

Homicide-Flippen v. State, 365 S.W.2d 895
(Tenn. 1963). Defendants were convicted of involuntary manslaughter. On appeal, defendants
contended that the evidence failed to support the
verdict. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed,
holding that where the evidence established that a
car driven by defendant Stalling, and in which
defendant Flippen was a passenger, hit the car in
which decedent, a little boy, was a passenger and
knocked it off the road into a lake where the little
Freedom of Association-United States v. Zuide- boy drowned, the jury was warranted in finding
veld, 316 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1963). See Conspiracy, defendant Stalling guilty of involuntary manslaughter; that when after the admitted impact
supra.
defendant Flippen looked back and did not see the
Freedom of Religion-Williford v. California, other car, he had a duty, which he failed to dis217 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Cal. 1963). Plaintiff charge, to warn defendant Stalling that something
Williford, a state prisoner, brought an action under serious must have happened and to go back and
the Federal Civil Rights Act against defendants, assist; and that since defendant Flippen, though
the people of California, the State Prison Warden, only a passenger in the lethal car, participated in
and others, seeking damages for harassment in the the crime by failing to go back and assist and by
exercise of his religion and for being prohibited aiding defendant Stalling later to hide the car, he
from exercising his religious beliefs in violation of too was properly convicted.
his First Amendment rights, and seeking an injunction to prevent the continuance of such violaImmunity From Prosecution-State v. Crow, 367
tion. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint S.W.2d 601 (Mo. 1963). Defendant was convicted
and for summary judgment. The District Court of burglary and stealing. On appeal, defendant congranted defendants' motion to dismiss and dis- tended that he had been promised immunity from
missed plaintiff's complaint, holding that even prosecution by the County Sheriff in consideration
though plaintiff, a Black Muslim, had an inviolable for defendant's giving the Sheriff information
constitutional right whether in or out of jail to which in fact solved 37 other crimes. The Supreme
believe whatever religious doctrine he chose, the Court of Missouri affirmed, holding that since
State, by preventing all Muslim activity in the defendant was not within any state immunity
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statute, his convictions must be affirmed, since the
Sheriff had no standing or authority to grant immunity from prosecution.
Improper Conduct by Prosecutor-Pekar v.
United States, 315 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963). See
Juries, infra.
Informers-People v. Coffey, 191 N.E.2d 263
(N.Y. 1963). Defendant's motion to suppress was
denied after hearing in the trialcourt, and theAppellate Division affirmed. On appeal by permission,
defendant contended that failure of the prosecution
to reveal the identity of an informer destroyed the
reliability of the proof of probable cause to arrest
defendant, and that therefore the evidence obtained through a search without a warrant incident to the arrest should be suppressed. The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that since
the principal elements of the informer's story were
checked out and found plausible before defendant
was arrested, the arresting officer had knowledge at
the time of arrest sufficient to constitute probable
cause; that since the arresting officer had probable
cause, the prosecution's refusal to name the informer would be error only if it made impossible a
fair hearing on defendant's motion to suppress;
and inasmuch as the informer was merely a transmitter of information rather than a competent
witness to the crime, and information supplied by
him was fully corroborated, defendant was not
prejudiced by inability to cross-examine the informer. The Court noted that the prosecution's
reasons for concealment were a promise to the
informant, possible danger to him, and full corroboration of the information he supplied.
Insanity-McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d
847 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Defendant was convicted of
manslaughter. On appeal, defendant contended
that the District Court erred in failing to submit to
the jury among other alternative verdicts that of
not guilty because of insanity, and in failing sua
sponte to give a Lyles instruction informing the
jury that, if acquitted by reason of insanity, defendant would be confined in a mental hospital
until it was determined that he could safely be returned to society [Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d
725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S.
961 (1958)]. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that since defendant bad introduced some evi-
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dence of mental disorder, he was entitled to have
the issue of insanity submitted to the jury; that
under the Durham rule the jury should be instructed that a " 'mental disease or defect' includes
any abnormal condition of the mind which substantially affects mental or emotional processes
and substantially impairs behavior controls"; and
that because defendant did not affirmatively waive
the Lyles instruction concerning the disposition of
one acquitted by reason of insanity, his conviction
must be reversed although he did not request the
instruction, since the Lyles instruction is mandatory in all cases where the issue of insanity must
be submitted to the jury unless waiver of the instruction appears affirmatively on the record.
Three judges (two concurring in result and one
dissenting in part) stated that the Lyles instruction
need be given only if affirmatively requested. [The
implication of the Court's proferred instruction
re what constitutes a "mental disease or defect,"
when considered in the context of this case, is that
subnormal intelligence alone may suffice. Defendant's IQ was 68.]
Insanity-Williams v. United States, 312 F.2d
862 (D.C. Cir. 1962). Defendant was convicted of
second degree murder and carrying a dangerous
weapon without a license. On appeal, defendant
contended that the District Court should have
directed a verdict of acquittal by reason of insanity. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that a District
Court should direct a verdict of acquittal by
reason of insanity only if, as a matter of law, the
evidence failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the offenses charged were not the
product of a mental disease or defect; and that
where, of eleven psychiatrists who gave expert
testimony at defendant's trial, only six characterized his mental condition as a "mental disease
or defect" and, of these six, only three said the
offenses were the product of the mental disorder,
reasonable men were not, as a matter of law, required to entertain a reasonable doubt as to defendant's legal responsibility for his acts, and
therefore the District Court was correct in failing
to direct the verdict.
Insanity-State v. Poulson, 381 P.2d 93 (Utah
1963). Defendant was convicted of first degree
murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in
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refusing to grant his requested instruction on the
issue of criminal responsibility, patterned after the
Durham rule. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed,
holding that the instruction given, which embodied
both the M'Naghten Rule and the "irresistible
impulse" test was a correct statement of Utah law,
and adequately protected defendant's interests;
and that neither the Durham rule nor the proposed A.L.I. rule would be adopted in lieu of the
law as stated in the insanity instruction given.
Juries-Pekar v. United States, 315 F.2d 319
(5th Cir. 1963). Defendant was convicted on six
counts of an indictment charging possession of
goods which he knew had been stolen after having
been in possession of an interstate common carrier.
On appeal, defendant contended that the District
Court erred in overruling his motion for mistrial
on the ground that, during a recess, the Assistant
United States Attorney who was prosecuting the
case had a conversation with one of the jurors, and
that the court erred in admitting illegally seized
evidence against him. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that
even though the conversation complained of did
not concern defendant's case, his conviction must
be reversed since the conversation established a
social contact between the juror and the prosecutor, and possibly prejudicial private communications between jurors and third persons compel reversal unless harmlessness is shown; and consequently the District Court erred in refusing to grant
defendant's motion for mistrial. Although the
Court did not have to reach defendant's second
contention-that illegally seized evidence was used
against him-in light of the above holding, it commented on this point because a new trial would be
had. The Court concluded that the evidence should
have been suppressed, inasmuch as the facts that
defendant reluctantly permitted FBI agents to
enter and "look around" as a result of being motivated by their "superior position," that he was told
the agents wanted to talk to him about an investigation, not that they wanted to search his
room, and that he refused to sign a search waiver,
all convinced the Court that defendant had not
consented to the search.

spiracy between defendant and two co-conspirators which resulted in the felony murder was
formed and plotted entirely outside Pennsylvania,
and since defendant had never until trial been
within Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania courts
lacked jurisdiction to try defendant for this offense
even though the felony murder took place in
Pennsylvania. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed, holding that the law imposes upon
a conspirator full responsibility for the natural and
probable consequences of acts committed by his
co-conspirators if such acts are done in furtherance
of the common purpose of the conspiracy; that one
is criminally liable in a given jurisdiction for acts
committed outside that jurisdiction if his acts
have criminal consequences within that jurisdiction; and consequently, the Pennsylvania courts
had jurisdiction to try defendant for felony murder,
since the purpose of the conspiracy was to effect a
robbery in Pennsylvania, and the felony murder
was a natural and probable consequence of the
conspiracy.
Juvenile Proceedings-Pilkington v. United
States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963). See Sentencing, infra.

Narcotics-People v. Wallace, 30 Cal. Rptr. 449
(1963). Defendant was convicted of possessing
heroin in violation of CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §11500, and a prior conviction under the
same section was proved. On appeal, defendant
contended that the trial court erred in holding, as
a matter of law, that because defendant had a prior
conviction, the court could neither grant probation
nor consider application of CAL. PEN. CODE §6451
(providing for civil commitment of narcotics
addicts). The Supreme Court of California reversed and remanded with directions, holding that
under the applicable statute, CAL. HEALTH &
SA.ETY CODE §11715.6, defendant was not eligible
for probation because of his prior conviction; but
that the trial judge erred in concluding, as a matter
of law, that the prior conviction precluded him
from exercising discretion under CAL. PEN. CODE
§6451; and consequently, although he was not
compelled to act under this section, the trial judge
Jurisdiction of the Subject Matter--Common- should have an opportunity to exercise his discrewealth v. Thomas, 189 A.2d 225 (Pa. 1963). De- tion as to defendant, inasmuch as the judge errofendant was convicted of felony murder. On ap- neously believed at defendant's trial that he had
peal, defendant contended that since the con- none to exercise.
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Narcotics-State v. Margo, 191 A.2d 43 (N.Y.
1963). Defendant was convicted of being under the
influence of a narcotic drug in violation of N.J.
STAT. §2A:170-8. On appeal by certification, defendant contended that the statute constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the doctrine
of Robinson v. California,370 U.S. 660, abstracted
at 53 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 492 (1962), insofar as
it punishes for being "under the influence" of a
narcotic as distinguished from the act of using a
drug. The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed,
holding that if a person can constitutionally be
punished for using a drug, there was no reason why
he could not be punished for being under its influence, since being under the influence of a drug
was itself antisocial behavior and was a voluntarily
induced active state capable of endangering society.
Obscenity-United States v. Zuideveld, 316 F.2d
873 (7th Cir. 1963). See Conspiracy, supra.
Prejudicial Publicity-Rideau v. Louisiana, 83
Sup. Ct. 1417 (1963). Petitioner was convicted of
murder, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana
affirmed. State v.Rideau, 137 So. 2d 351 (La.),
abstracted at 53 J.Camm. L., C. & P.S. 351 (1962).
On certiorari, petitioner contended that the trial
court's denial of his motion for change of venue,
grounded on impossibility of obtaining a fair trial
in Calcasieu Parish due to television broadcast of
his confession, constituted denial of due process of
law. The United States Supreme Court, per Stewart, J., reversed, holding that where a motion
picture of petitioner's pre-arraignment interview,
which lasted 20 minutes and consisted of interrogation by the sheriff and detailed admissions of the
crime by petitioner, was broadcast over a local
TV station on three consecutive days to an aggregate of some 97,000 viewers, denial of petitioner's
motion for change of venue denied him due process,
since "due process of law in this case required a
trial before a jury drawn from a community of
people who had not seen and heard Rideau's televised 'interview.' "The Court noted that, although
local law enforcement officials apparently instigated the broadcast plan, "the question of who
originally initiated the idea... is ... a basically

irrelevant detail." While mentioning that the
convicting jury included three jurors who stated on
voir dire that they had seen and heard the "interview" at least once, the Court reached its result

(Vol. 54

"without pausing to examine a particularized
transcript of the voir dire examination of members
of the jury," thus apparently resting the holding on
prejudice presumed from the extensiveness of the
broadcast. Justice Clark wrote a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Harlan joined, stating that no
causal connection was established between the
broadcasts and petititioner's trial, and that to
compel reversal, prejudice to petitioner caused by
the publicity must be established rather than presumed.
Presumption of Innocence-State v. Robbins, 189
N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). See Right to a
Fair Trial, infra.
Reasonable Doubt-State v. Robbins, 189
N.E.2d 641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). See Right to a
Fair Trial, infra.
Recordation of Trial Proceedings-Parrott v.
United States, 314 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1963); Brown
v. United States, 314 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1963). See
Right to a Fair Trial-Violation of Statutory Mandate to Record Proceedings, infra.
Right to Counsel-Kilough v. United States,
315 F.2d 241 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See Confessions,
supra.
Right to Counsel-United States ex rel. Ormento
v. Warden, 216 F. Supp. 609 (D. Kan. 1963).
Petitioner was convicted by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New
York of conspiring to violate federal narcotics
laws. On petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, within which district petitioner was then
incarcerated, petitioner, whose appeal to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was pending, contended that he was confined in a federal penitentiary so far from his lawyers that he was being
denied the effective assistance of counsel. Taking
judicial notice of Federal Bureau of Prisons regulations requiring censorship of all mail to and from
inmates of the U.S. Penitentiary at Leavenworth,
wherein petitioner was confined, the District Court
issued the writ, ordering respondent to deliver
petitioner to the U.S. Marshal for the District of
Kansas, and directing this Marshal to deliver
petitioner to the custody of the U.S. Marshal for
the Southern District of New York, holding that
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since petitioner, who elected not to commence
service of sentence pending disposition on appeal
and was not admitted to bail, was confined about
1500 miles from New York, where resided the attorneys who represented him at trial and were continuing as his counsel on the pending appeal, petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel was violated in light of the prison's mail
censorship regulations; and consequently, petitioner must be transferred and held at such place
as will not unreasonably interfere with his right to
confer with his attorneys.

have entertained this concern unless it believed
Gideon was retroactively applicable. The rule,
copied almost verbatim from 28 U.S.C. §2255, was
designed to provide a simplified, expeditious and
efficient post-conviction procedure in the court
which imposed sentence, and thus to limit the
number of original habeas corpus petitions filed in
the Florida Supreme Court.
Right to Counsel-People v. Escobedo, 190
N.E.2d 825 (Ill. 1963). See Confessions, supra.

Right to a Fair Trial-Rideau v. Louisiana, 83
Ct. 1417 (1963). See Prejudicial Publicity,
Sup.
Right to Counsel-Commonwealth ex rel. Craig
v. Banmiller, 189 A.2d 875 (Pa. 1963); Roy v. supra.
Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963). The SuRight to a Fair Trial-State v. Robbins, 189
preme Courts of two states have recently had an
641 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963). Having waived
N.E.2d
opportunity to discuss the retroactivity of Gideon
his right to trial by jury, defendant was convicted
v. Wainwright, 83 Sup. Ct. 792, abstracted at 54
J. Cmm. L., C. & P.S. 193 (1963), which held that of arson by a statutory three-judge court. On
all defendants are entitled to assistance of counsel appeal, defendant contended that his constitutional rights were violated because his conviction
in state criminal prosecutions as a requirement
rested upon a concurrence of only two of the three
process.
due
Amendment
of Fourteenth
In Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Banmiller, the judges. The Court of Appeals of Ohio reversed and
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to apply remanded, holding that when defendant waived
Gideon to the case of petitioner, who pleaded guilty "trial by jury" he did not also waive "a trial," and
without assistance of counsel more 30 years before therefore he retained all the constitutional and
Gideon was decided. The Court did not detail its statutory rights of a defendant on trial before a
reasons for reaching this conclusion, but merely jury with the exception of the jury; that among the
stated, "A reading of Gideon indicates that its rights thus retained were the presumption of innoapplication is prospective rather than retroactive cence and the requirement of proof beyond a
and its requirement is that in the future all de- reasonable doubt; that the presumption of innofendants in [state] criminal prosecutions. . . are cence was overcome only upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt; that the existence of a difference
entitled to the appointment of counsel."
The holding of the Florida Supreme Court in of opinion as to defendant's guilt among the reaRoy v. Wainwright was simply that petitioner's sonable and experienced trial judges in and of itself
post-conviction application for habeas corpus injected a reasonable doubt into the case; and
based on alleged denial of counsel at his trial must consequently defendant's conviction must be
be dismissed without prejudice to his rights to reversed, since the presumption of innocence and
proceed under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
since that newly promulgated rule governed the demand that the verdict of a three-judge court be
relief sought by petitioner. The significance of this unanimous in order to be valid.
case, however, lies in the Florida Supreme Court's
Right to a Fair Trial-Violation of Statutory
view, as expressed in the opinion, that Gideon
applies retroactively. The Court stated that the Mandate to Record Proceedings-Parrolt v. United
reason it promulgated the rule under its state con- States, 314 F.2d 46 (10th Cir. 1963); Brown v.
United States, 314 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1963). Two
stitutional rule-making power was the expected
post-Gideon increase in original habeas corpus of the federal circuits have recently decided cases
petitions on denial of counsel grounds filed in that involving failure of the trial court reporter to
Court, as predicted from statistics as to the num- record all proceedings in criminal cases had in open
court as required by 28 U.S.C. §753(b)(1).
ber of presently incarcerated prisoners who lacked
In Parrottv. United States, defendant contended
not
would
obviously
counsel at trial. The Court
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that he was prejudiced when the trial judge during
the voir dire examination stated in the presence of
the jury that three other like charges were pending
against defendant. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for new
trial, holding that unavailability of a full transcript due to failure of the court reporter to record
the voir dire examination in violation of the statute
made it impossible to determine whether the
admitted error (the trial judge's remark) was
harmless or prejudicial.
Defendant in Brown v. United States did not suggest any error that may have occurred in the
prosecutor's summation, but rather urged that the
court reporter's violation of the statute by failing
to record the summations in itself required reversal
and new trial. Stating that unless the prosecutor's
closing argument contained error affecting defendant's substantial rights, failure to record those
argumentswouldbe mere harmless error, the Court
vacated and remanded to the District Court for a
hearing [presumably one at which persons present
during the summation would attempt to reconstruct it] to determine whether defendant was
prejudiced by the error of failing to record the arguments.
Scientific Evidence-Lie Detector EvidenceLooper v. State, 381 P.2d 1018 (Okla. Crim. App.'
1963); Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 191 N.E.2d 479
(Mass. 1963); State v. Green, 121 N.W.2d 89
(Iowa 1963); People v. Zazzetta, 189 N.E.2d 260
(Ill. 1963). The courts of four states in three
different contexts have recently considered the
question of admissibility of polygraph evidence in
a criminal case.
In both Looper v. State and Commonwealth v.
Fatalo, the issue was whether a defendant could
complain of the trial court's refusal to admit results of a lie detector test. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals and the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, respectively, replied in the
negative and affirmed. Both courts rested their
decisions on the ground that the polygraph lacked
general scientific recognition. [The Massachusetts
case, Fatalo, was one of first impression in that
state.]
The Supreme Court of Iowa, in deciding State v.
Green, held that the prosecutor's reference in his
opening statement to defendant's agreement to
take a lie detector test and the prosecutor's subsequent attempts to inject the matter into the trial
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constituted reversible error where no evidence was
introduced that defendant had submitted to such
test, even though cautionary instructions were
given, inasmuch as evidence of and reference to lie
detector tests were inadmissible, and because it
appeared through affidavit that at least one juror
during deliberations had considered defendant's
failure to live up to his agreement to take the test.
The defendant in People v. Zazzetta contended
that admission in evidence of the results of his
polygraph test was reversible error even though he
had requested the test and had orally stipulated in
open court that the results be introduced in evidence. The Illinois Supreme Court, which had not
previously decided the general question whether
results of lie detector tests are admissible, reversed
and remanded without having to face that question, holding that regardless of the view adopted as
to scientific reliability, "the expertise of the operator and interpreter has substantial bearing on the
reliability of the polygraph," and consequently the
evidence in question was improperly admitted
despite defendant's stipulation, since the expert
was not available for cross-examination and there
was no evidence regarding the method of testing
and the qualifications of the operator. The Court
stated that binding a criminal defendant by a
stipulation as to the trustworthiness of scientific
opinion far beyond his knowledge was manifestly
unfair.
Scientific Evidence--Radar-Crosby v. Commonwealth, 130 S.E.2d 467 (Va. 1963). Defendant
was convicted of speeding as determined by radar.
On writ of error, defendant contended that the
tests for accuracy of the radar machine were not
correctly proved at the trial. The Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia reversed and remanded, holding that tests for accuracy must be carried out on
radar machines before and after they are used, and
in a subsequent prosecution for speeding such tests
must be proved by proper evidence; that where the
machine in question was tested by one police
officer driving through the radar zone at various
speeds while another officer read the radar meter,
it was hearsay for the officer who drove through the
radar zone to testify as to what the reading was on
the radar machine, since the radar readings were
observed by the other officer out of the presence of
the witness; and since the improper admission of
hearsay evidence deprived defendant of his opportunity to examine both officers as to the sufficiency
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of the test, defendant must be afforded a new trial.
The Court noted that although a statute [VA.
CODE §46.1-198 (1950)] provides that radar checks
are prima facie evidence of speed, the Commonwealth retained the burden of proving the machine's accuracy.
Search and Seizure-Irby v. United States, 314
F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Defendant appealed
from the District Court's ruling in favor of the
validity of the search warrant authorizing a search
which yielded illicit narcotics. Defendant contended that the affidavits upon which the warrant
was issued failed to set forth probable cause for
belief that criminal acts were being committed on
the premises in question. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding
that where the affidavit set forth direct knowledge
of affiants, experienced narcotic squad officers,
that on one occasion seven known narcotics addicts
were in front of the premises, which were occupied
by a convicted narcotic seller, and statements made
to the affiants on another occasion by a "special
employee" (informer) that the informer had purchased drugs on the premises and had been told
that the drug peddler who lived there had been
away "capping" heroin, the facts set forth in the
affidavit constituted probable cause for an experienced narcotic squad officer to believe that illegal
narcotics were concealed on the premises; and consequently the warrant was properly issued. Judge
Wright dissented because the policemen waited
over six weeks after the first incident and eight
days after the second before obtaining the warrant.
Search and Seizure-Pekarv. United Stales, 315
F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1963). See Juries, supra.
Search and Seizure-Sirimarco v. United States,
315 F.2d 699 (10th Cir. 1963). Defendant was convicted of uttering and possessing counterfeit
Federal Reserve Notes. On appeal, defendant contended that the notes received in evidence which
he was convicted of possessing were illegally seized
by a federal officer without a warrant after defendant had been arrested by a Colorado officer for
violation of state law (passing a counterfeit note).
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed, holding that although the federal search
could not be justified as incident to the state arrest, the federal officer's knowledge of the reason
for defendant's state arrest constituted probable

cause to believe that defendant had committed a
federal offense and that defendant had used his
car in connection with the transportation of
counterfeit money; that the federal officer's
seizure of defendant's car without a warrant was
lawful, since under 49 U.S.C. §783 (1958) probable
cause to believe that a vehicle has been used to
transport contraband justifies the vehicle's
seizure; and since a vehicle seized under authority
of §783 may be searched without warrant or
consent, the evidence was properly admitted. The
Tenth Circuit denied defendant's post-affirmance
petition for rehearing, Judges Murrah and Hill
dissenting from denial on the ground that since
the special rule justifying search and seizure of a
vehicle upon probable cause that it is being used to
transport contraband is conditioned on the impracticality of securing a search warrant due to the
vehicle's ease of mobility, that rule should not
have been applied to the instant case, where defendant was incarcerated, the vehicle was parked
next to the County Sheriff's office, and there was
no reason for failure to obtain a search warrant.
[See Arrest, Search and Seizure-United States v.
Viale, 312 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1963). Regarding the
principle enunciated in Sirimarco that a federal
search cannot be justified as incident to a state
arrest, Viale is not conflicting. In Sirimarco, the
arrest was made by state officers and the search by
federal officers, whereas in Viale, although the
legality of arrest was determined by state law,
both arrest and search were made by federal
officers.]
Search and Seizure--Walker v. Peppersack, 316
F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963). Petitioner was convicted
in a Maryland state court of armed robbery. On
appeal from the federal District Court's denial of
his application for habeas corpus, petitioner contended that his federal constitutional rights were
violated by use of illegally seized evidence against
him. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded with directions that the
District Court should afford the State of Maryland
a reasonable opportunity to retry petitioner, and in
default, should order his release, holding that
petitioner had sufficiently exhausted his state
remedies to petition for federal habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. §2254, since none was presently
available to him; that under Hall v. Warden, 313
F.2d 483 (4th Cir.), abstracted at 54 J. CRir. L.,
C. & P.S. 342 (1963), Mapp v. Ohio applied retro-
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actively to petitioner's conviction, even though he
failed to object to admission of the evidence at the
trial and to raise the question on direct appeal in
the state courts, since to do so would have been
futile under the then existing law of Maryland; that
the state trial court's denial of petitioner's post-admission motion to strike the evidence on the ground
that petitioner was not in control of the premisesthe Maryland test for standing to object to a
search-was incorrect, since petitioner was lawfully on the premises-the requisite standing under
federal decisional law-, and the federal test controlled; and since the search and seizure under
attack were made without a warrant, without consent, and not incident to lawful arrest, the evidence
was unconstitutionally seized and, by authority of
the Mapp case, should not have been admitted, and
petitioner's application for habeas corpus must
therefore be granted.

which had been seized thereunder. On interlocutory appeal by the State, defendants contended
that the complaint on which the warrant was
issued was based on unreliable hearsay statements
of an informer and thus that the complaint failed
to establish probable cause for issuance of the
warrant. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
and remanded with directions to overrule the
motion to quash and suppress, holding that since
the complaint on which the warrant was issued
established the credibility of the informer by
means of the affiant's statements that the informer
was known to him and had in the past supplied
him with reliable information with regard to illegal
gambling, the complaint established probable cause
and the warrant was properly issued, because
hearsay evidence alone can constitute probable
cause where, as in this case, the reliability of the
informer was shown.

Search and Seizure-Castaneda v. Superior
Court, 30 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963). Petitioner, charged
with possession of heroin, sought prohibition to
prevent his trial, contending that evidence to be
used against him was obtained through unlawful
search and seizure. The California Supreme Court
issued the writ and vacated a lower court judgment
denying relief, 26 Cal. Rptr. 364 (Dist. Ct. App.
1962), abstracted at 54 J. CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 195
(1963), holding that since the search and seizure
complained of were without a warrant and too
geographically removed from the place of petitioner's lawful arrest to be justified as incident
thereto, the search and seizure would be valid and
the evidence admissible only if petitioner had
given consent; and that where petitioner was under
arrest and handcuffed, and was not asked to nor
did he express consent to the search of his home,
petitioner could not be deemed to have consented
to the search, even though before the officers
searched his home, where the incriminating evidence was found, petitioner had attempted to mislead the officers by taking them to the homes of
various relatives. The Court noted that petitioner's
deceptive tactics were not unlawful, since petitioner was under no duty to assist the officers in
securing evidence against him.

Search and Seizure-Peoplev. Kelly, 189 N.E.2d
477 (N.Y. 1963). Defendants' criminal convictions
(the nature of which is not stated in the opinion)
were reversed by the Appellate Part of the New
York Court of Special Sessions. On the State's
appeal by permission, the State contended that
failure to except at the trial to the admission
of the allegedly illegally seized evidence complained
of on appeal constituted waiver of that point of
law. The Court of Appeals of New York affirmed
the Appellate Part's reversal, holding that, although failure to bring the illegal evidence issue to
the attention of the trial court renders that point
unavailable in the Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court may reverse in the interests
of justice regardless of waiver for failure to raise
objections or exceptions, and in arriving at its conclusion as to "interests of justice" may take into
account the circumstance that illegally seized
evidence was used at the trial.

Search and Seizure-People v. Williams, 190
N.E.2d 303 (Ill. 1963). Defendants were charged
with state gambling offenses. The trial court
granted defendants' motion to quash the search
warrant and to suppress gambling paraphernalia

Search and Seizure-Villasino v. Maxwell, 190
N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1963). Petitioner was convicted
of receiving or concealing stolen goods and possessing hypodermic needles. On petition for writ of
habeas corpus, petitioner contended that his incarceration was based on illegally obtained evidence and thus was void under the constitutional
principles enunciated in MapP v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, abstracted at 52 J. Cim. L., C. & P.S. 292
(1961). Assumingarguendo thatan illegal search and
seizure did produce evidence against petitioner,
the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that
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since Mapp v. Ohio appears to be directed as a
deterrent against unconstitutional methods of law
enforcement, it applied prospectively only and thus
would not be applied to petitioner's case, since he
was sentenced before Mapp was decided, at a time
when illegally seized evidence was admissible in
Ohio state criminal proceedings; but that in any
event, petitioner could not claim that he was convicted on illegally obtained evidence, because he
pleaded guilty and there was thus no trial and no
evidence admitted against him.
Search and Seizure--Commonwealth v. Wright,
190 A.2d 709 (Pa. 1963). Defendant, under indictment for murder, petitioned the trial court to suppress money as evidence, and the court granted the
petition. On appeal by the Commonwealth, defendant contended that his wife did not give valid
consent to a search of their apartment so as to
waive defendant's right not to have the evidence
so obtained used against him. The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed Ihe order of suppression,
holding that where police officers falsely represented to defendant's wife that defendant (who
was then under arrest) had admitted the crime and
had sent them for the "stuff," the wife's compliance with their demands did not constitute consent, since consent cannot be gained through deceit
or misrepresentation; and even though the officers
conducted no search, their seizure of the money
produced by the wife was gained through deceit
and misrepresentation, and this vitiated the
seizure as effectively as if a search had been involved.
Search and Seizure-Clinton v. Commonwealth,
130 S.E.2d 437 (Va. 1963). See Electronic Eavesdropping, suepra.
Self-Defense-Aven v. State, 152 So. 2d 924
(Miss. 1963). Defendant was convicted of manslaughter. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion
for directed verdict of not guilty and his requested
written instruction directing the jury to find him
not guilty. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed and ordered defendant discharged, holding
that since defendant was the only eye-witness to
the homicide, his version should have been accepted as true, inasmuch as it was not substantially contradicted in material particulars by the
evidence against him; and since defendant's
testimony showed a clear case of self-defense

which was not contradicted directly or by fair
inference, defendant was entitled to a directed
verdict of not guilty.
Self-Incrimination-Namet v. United States, 83
Sup. Ct. 1151 (1963). See Accomplice Witnesses,
supra.
Self-Incrimination-Redfield v. United States,
315 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1963); Redfield v. May, ibid.
Defendant was convicted of attempted income tax
evasion by a jury in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Nevada. After conviction defendant
moved the Nevada District Court to have the
sentence vacated, set aside, or corrected, and also
applied for habeas corpus in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of California,
within which district he was then incarcerated.
Defendant's appeals from the Nevada District
Court's denial of his alternative motions and from
the California court's denial of his application for
habeas corpus were consolidated for argument and
disposition. On appeal, defendant contended that
the trial court violated his privilege against selfincrimination by advising him of his right to take
the witness stand, suggesting that he take the
stand, and cross-examining him, all in the presence
of the jury. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed, holding that since defendant,
while purporting to act in the role of counsel,
voluntarily and persistently testified throughout
his trial, though not under oath, in disregard of the
trial court's admonishments and orders not to
testify without being sworn, defendant effectively
waived his privilege against self-incrimination;
and consequently, the trial court's actions did not
violate defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege.
The Court noted that defendant rejected offers of
appointment of counsel, electing to serve the dual
role of defendant and counsel; that the trial court's
actions in advising him of his right to testify and
suggesting that he take the stand were for the purpose of preventing defendant from testifying not
under oath; and that the court's "cross-examination" of defendant occurred after defendant's
waiver of the privilege and while defendant was
cross-examining a prosecution witness.
Self-Incrimination-United States v. Sobell, 314
F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1963). Defendant was convicted
in 1951 of conspiring with his co-defendants,
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, to violate 50 U.S.C.
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§32(a) (1946), which made it a crime to reveal to a
foreign government information relating to the
national defense. On appeal from the District
Court's denial of his post-conviction motion for
relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255, inter alia, defendant
contended that for purposes of determining the
credibility of exculpatory answers by Mrs. Rosenberg to certain questions at their trial, the jury was
allowed to consider the fact that she had claimed
her privilege against self-incrimination with regard to the same matters before the grand jury;
that Mrs. Rosenberg's testimony, if believed,
tended to establish defendant's innocence; and
that under the rule of Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391 (1957)-declaring that while a defendant's prior claim of privilege has probative
value as to his credibility, this value is outweighed
by the possible impermissible impact on the jurydefendant's §2255 motion should have been
granted, inasmuch as the jury in determining his
guilt was allowed to consider the inadmissible
evidence of Mrs. Rosenberg's prior claim of privilege. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that a §2255 motion could be
granted in this case only if the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States; that the U.S. Supreme Court in
Grunewald was creating a rule of evidence in exercise of that Court's supervisory power over the
lower federal courts rather than enforcing a constitutional claim; that even if Grunewald was constitutionally grounded, any constitutional implications would be limited to the person whose claim
of privilege was later used against him, since the
privilege is that of the witness, not of another, such
as the party on trial; and consequently, even if the
jury's consideration of Mrs. Rosenberg's privilege
claim constituted error as to defendant Sobell
which would have been grounds for reversal on
direct appeal, this error was not constitutional as
to him so as to authorize granting of a §2255 motion. The Court noted that allowing the jury to
consider Mrs. Rosenberg's privilege claim was not
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error under the law existing in the Second Circuit
at the time of trial.
Sentencing-Pilkingon v. United States, 315
F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963). Petitioner was convicted
of stealing personal property within a federal
enclave. On appeal from the District Court's summary denial of his petition for post-conviction
relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255, petitioner contended
that after he pleaded guilty in reliance on the trial
judge's representation that the maximum penalty
was five years imprisonment, the judge sentenced
him to a term of 60 days to six years under the
Federal Youth Corrections Act. The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded with direction to the District Court to
conduct a hearing on the petition, holding that a
§2255 petition can be dismissed without a hearing
only if the allegations and record conclusively
show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief;
that petitioner's sentence under the Youth Offender Act constituted a deprivation of liberty
even though such confinement was aimed at correction and rehabilitation rather than punishment,
and thus constituted a penalty greater than that
which petitioner was informed was the maximum
which could be imposed; that petitioner's allegation that he relied on the trial judge's representation, if true, would entitle him to relief; and
consequently petitioner was entitled to a hearing
on his petition. The Court of Appeals relied on
Jones v. Cunningham, 83 Sup. Ct. 373, abstracted
at 54 J. Clmu. L., C. & P.S. 190 (1963) (parolee in
"custody" for habeas corpus purposes) in concluding that the six year youth sentence was in
fact a greater penalty than the five year adult
sentence.
Speedy Trial-United States ex rel. Von Cseh v.
Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963). See Due Process
of Law, supra.
Statutory Construction-Smart v. State, 190
N.E.2d 650 (Ind. 1963). See Burglary, supra.

